Alexander of Aphrodisias (c. 150-210), the most famous commentator on Aristotle, wrote 500 years after Aristotle’s death, at a time when Aristotle and Plato were rather forgotten minor philosophers in the age of Stoics, Epicureans, and Skeptics. He defended a view of moral responsibility we would call libertarianism today.

Greek philosophy had no precise term for “free will” as did Latin (liberum arbitrium or libera voluntas). The discussion was in terms of responsibility, what “depends on us” (in Greek ἐφ ἡμῖν). Alexander believed that Aristotle was not a strict determinist like the Stoics, and Alexander himself argued that some events do not have predetermined causes.

In particular, he held that man is responsible for self-caused decisions, and can choose to do or not to do something. This appears to be not very different from the Stoic Chrysippus‘ idea that one can assent or dissent to an action. Chrysippus said actions are pre-determined (fated) but not necessitated.

Alexander denied three things - necessity (ἀνάγκη), the foreknowledge of fated events that was part of the Stoic identification of God and Nature, and determinism in the sense of a sequence of causes that was laid down beforehand (προκαταβεβλημένος) or predetermined by antecedents (προηγουμένος).

Alexander says that the Stoic assent (συγκατάθεσις) requires a choice after deliberating (βουλεύεσθαι) among alternative possibilities. (De Fato, XIV, 184.13)

If Stoic pre-determinism is true and there was but a single choice, men would deliberate “for no reason” (μάτην). (De Fato, XI-XII)

Chrysippus calls assent a choice (προαίρεσισ). Perhaps inconsistently with his Stoic doctrine of fate, Chrysippus thinks alternatives are possible in some sense.

Alexander says that what gives man the power of a rational assent is the existence of new beginnings. He goes to the extreme of making this the essence of humanity (sounding very Hegelian),

To be rational (λογικῷ) is nothing other than to be the origin (ἀρχή) of one’s actions.
(De Fato, XIV, 184.15)For man is the origin (ἀρχή) and cause (αίτια) of actions that happen through him (δι’ αὐτοῦ)
(De Fato, XV, 185.11)

Alexander says that these origins allow agents to do otherwise in the same circumstances (τῶν αὐτῶν περιεστώτων) at another time (ἄλλοτε). (De Fato, XV, 185.8)

Doing otherwise requires the existence of real alternative possibilities. Unfortunately, Alexander does not see that the role of chance is merely to generate these possibilities, creating new causal chains which can be evaluated for the best choice of action.

(R. W. Sharples translation)

[The Stoics] say that this universe, which is one and contains in itself all that exists, and is organised by a Nature which is alive, rational and intelligent, possesses the organisation of the things that are, which is eternal and progresses according to a certain sequence and order; the things which come to be first are causes for those after them, and in this way all things are bound together with one another. Nothing comes to be in the universe in such a way that there is not something else which follows it with no alternative and is attached to it as to a cause; nor, on the other hand, can any of the things which come to be subsequently be disconnected from the things which have come to be previously, so as not to follow some one of them as if bound to it. But everything which has come to be is followed by something else which of necessity depends on it as a cause, and everything which comes to be has something preceding it to which it is connected as a cause. For nothing either is or comes to be in the universe without a cause, because there is nothing of the things in it that is separated and disconnected from all the things that have preceded.

a single uncaused event would make the universe collapse

For the universe would be torn apart and divided and not remain single for ever, organised according to a single order and organisation, if any causeless motion were introduced; and it would be introduced, if all the things that are and come to be did not have causes* which have come to be beforehand [and] which they follow of necessity. And they say that for something to come to be without a cause is similar to, and as impossible as, the coming to be of something from what is not. The organisation of the whole, which is like this, goes on from infinity to infinity evidently and unceasingly.
(De Fato, XXII, 191.32-192.18)

the famous “causal chain”

…all the things that are become causes of some of the things after them, and that in this way things are connected to one another by the later being attached to the earlier in the manner of a chain (ἄλυσις), this being what they propose as the essence as if it were of fate.
(De Fato, XXII, 193.5-193.8)

The present truth value of statements about the future was an important argument that occupied Aristotle (the “sea-battle” of de Int. IX), Epicurus, and the Stoics. It was thought by many to demonstrate the necessity of fate. But it is dismissed as mere words by some commentators, Carneades, for example. Alexander says those who make this argument are childish or joking, and do not know what they are talking about.

[The Stoics make] the argument that the proposition ‘there will be a sea-battle tomorrow’ can be true but not also necessary; for what is necessary is what is always true, but this [proposition] no longer remains true when the sea-battle comes to be; but if this is not necessary, neither is what is signified by it of necessity, [namely] that there will be a sea-battle. But if there will be a sea-battle, but not of necessity (since it is true that there will be a sea-battle, but not [true that there will be a sea-battle] of necessity), clearly [there will be a sea-battle] contingently; and if contingently, the coming-to-be of some things contingently is not done away with by the coming-to-be of all things in accordance with fate.But this [is an argument] of those who both jest and do not know what they are talking about. For neither is everything that comes to be of necessity necessary, if what is necessary is the eternal, but what comes to be of necessity has been prevented from being like this by its very coming-to-be; nor is the proposition that asserts this [sc. what comes to be of necessity] necessary, if what is signified by it is not of this sort [sc. necessary]. (For we do not describe every proposition, in which what is necessary is contained, as ipso facto] necessary; for it is not in this way that it is judged that a proposition is necessary, but by its not being able to change from being true to being false.)

If then [the proposition that asserts what comes to be of necessity] is not necessary, it has not at all been prevented from being true, just as ‘there will be a sea-battle tomorrow’. For, [even] if [when] stated as [something] necessary it is not true because of the addition of the necessary, if it does not become necessary by the addition of ‘of necessity’ it will still be true in the same way as [the proposition] uttered without this addition. But if this is true, when the next day arrives the proposition that ‘a sea-battle came to be of necessity’ will be true; and if of necessity, not contingently.

And indeed, if ‘there will be a sea-battle tomorrow’ is true, it will always be the case that a sea-battle came to be in accordance with fate, if indeed all the things that come to be are in accordance with fate. But if in accordance with fate, unalterably, and if unalterably, it cannot not come to be, and it is impossible for that not to come to be which cannot come to be; and how can we say that that for which it is impossible not to come to be can also not come to be, since it is necessary for that to come to be for which it is impossible not to come to be? So all the things that come to be in accordance with fate will be of necessity, according to them, and not also contingently, as they say in jest.
(De Fato, X, 177.7-178.8)

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